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NOTES

THE NEGLIGENT CRIMINAL BATTERY IN PENNSYLVANIA
Problem
The purposes of this note are: first, to determine whether a person may be
convicted in the Pennsylvania Criminal Courts of an assault and battery resulting
from an unintentional touching arising out of negligent conduct, and second, to
examine the development of this concept in Pennsylvania, evaluating the influence
exerted on it by the automobile.
It is important to bear in mind the distinction between the intent to commit
act
which causes the injury and the intent to cause the injury. An intentional
the
battery can mean only the latter, for in the former sense practically all touchings
could be considered intentional.

Examination of Cases
Is there such a thing in Pennsylvania as a negligent criminal battery? The
language used in the latest appellate court case would make one somewhat doubtful. The court says that a criminal intent is necessary to sustain a prosecution for
assault and battery, "that it must have been intentional, not accidental or merely
negligent", but then adds, "of course the criminal intent--the intent to injuremay ... be inferred from the circumstances". The court deems such circumstances
to be the grossly negligent use of an automobile in wanton disregard of another's
safety.' The difficulty in determining Pennsylvania's position may be partially relieved by examining the previous cases.
The first instance this writer has been able to find is an unreported lower court
case of 1848 mentioned in the 8th edition of Binns' [ustice.2 The court charged
that the defendant was guilty of assault and battery if he injured another by riding
his horse at an immoderate gait. Intent was not mentioned, and the court spoke as
though the law were settled, saying that it had invariably so instructed. The same
court stated in 1850 that a carter who allowed his horse and cart to proceed along
the street while he was walking on the footway would be guilty of assault and battery if they hit another.' Again there was no mention of intent. In 1871 in a reported lower court Case where the issue was an intentional assault and battery, the
court said by way of dicta that if a person threw a stone, or other dangerous things,
on the highway and hit another, the person doing such negligent act could be convicted of assault and battery though he had no intention whatsoever to injure anyone. 4 The early cases indicate that the negligent criminal battery did exist, but none

of them reached the appellate court.
1 Com. v. Ireland, 149 Pa. Super. 298, 27 A. 2d 746 (1942).
2 Com. v. Way Q. S. Phila. (1849) Binns' JUSTICE, 8th Ed. 456.
8 Com. v. Cox Q. S. Phila. (1850) Bright Dig. 3365.
4 Com. v. Fleet, 8 Phila. 614 (1871).
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The case which is ordinarily cited as establishing that an intent to injure will be
inferred from certain circumstances is'a Pennsylvania Supreme Court Case of 1882.5
The defendant fired a pistol in a crowded railroad car in a spirit of frolic intending
merely to frighten ad not to injure anyone. He was indicted for assault and battery
and aggravated assault and battery, and the Supreme Court in upholding the conviction said that the law would imply malice from the fact that the act was recklessly
and willfully done. However, the main argument centered about the count of aggravated assault and battery and the Court's decision seems limited to that offense.
This is particularly evident from a reading of the report of the trial court. 6 Since
aggravated assault and battery is purely a statutory crime1 and as the part of the
statute under which the defendant was indicted required malice, the language of
inference was necessary to hurdle this obstacle. Two later cases, one involving a
pistols and the other a truck9 found the court implying the necessary statutory
malice in a similar manner.
On the issue of simple assault and battery, we must return to the lower courts.
In 1897, it was said that the law of Pennsylvania was well settled, that it was not
necessary for the Commonwealth to show that the defendant intended to hit the
prosecutor to convict him of assault and battery, but that it was sufficient if the defendant was driving his horse and carriage so carelessly, wantonly, and recklessly
as to endanger the lives of others. 10 It is to be noted that in none of the cases where
the Court spoke of a simple assault and battery was there any mention of intent.
The next cases take us into the automobile era. In 191311 and 191812 the
Superior Court without mentioning intent, negligence, or the inferring of the one
from the other, held that a conviction for assault and battery would be sustained
where the defendant drove his car at a high rate of speed, zig-zagged across the
road, swerved into a ditch on the wrong side of the road, and struck an obstruction
which threw his car into the path of an approaching car. In 1926 two lower court
Cases held that reckless operation of an automobile in disregard of other's rights
and safety would sustain a conviction of assault and battery. 8
The requisite of intent first appeared in Commonwealth v. Muska, 92 Pa.

Super. 121 (1927), where the court in upholding a conviction of assault and battery arising out of an automobile hitting a pedestrian said, "the intent necessary for
a conviction on this criminal charge may be supplied or inferred from such reddess
and wanton operation of a car". This is often referred to as transitional language,

language used to perform the function of making the change from intent to negli6 Smith v. Com., 100 Pa. 324 (1882).
6 Com. v. Lister, 15 Phila. 405 (1882).
7 Act of June 24, 1939, PL 872, 18 PS 4709 (Pa.).
8 Corn. v. Scutick, LO5 Pa. Super. 524, 161 A. 610 (1932),
2 Com. v. Raspa, 138 Pa. Super 26, 9 A. 2d 925 (1939).
10 Corn. v. Dooley, 19 Pa. C.C. 367 (1897).
11 Corn. v. Bergdoll, 55 Pa. Super. 186 (1913).
1 Corn. v. Gayton, 69 Pa. Super. 513 (1918).
IS Com. v. Renninger, 19 Berks 291 (1921); Corn. v. Kline, 9 D &C448 (Pa. 1926).

NOTES.

gence. But it is submitted that previous holdings had made this smoke screen unnecessary. Earlier cases using such language were referring to aggravated assault
and battery wherein it was necessary to prove malice. When the issue was ordinary
assault and battery, the court had simply said that circumstances showing a certain
degree of negligence would be sufficient. They had avoided the seemingly useless
task of requiring intent and then inferring it from circumstances which showed
only negligence. Furthermore, the court said the intent could be supplied or inferred. Were the words used synonymously? Will the same facts which support an
inference of intent also supply intent? Apparently the words mean the same thing,
as later cases using similar language speak only of inferring intent.
The next appellate court case added to the confusion. The court, although
citing the Muska case as authority, did not follow the language used in it, with respect to intent, but instead reverted to the earlier cases in holding that the proof
required was that the car was being driven in a manner involving a reckless disregard for the safety of others. 1' They also said that gross negligence was necessary
to support a criminal conviction. In the case next following, this holding was quoted
but the court added, "from such conduct the necessary intent to injure may be inferred". 15 Then in Commonwealth v. Bergen, 134 Pa. Super. 62, 4 A. 2d 164
"The conduct of the defendant must be so gross or wanton that an intent to injure
may be inferred". In the lower courts there was the same vacillation between merely
requiring reckless conduct, and requiring intent but inferring it from such conduct. 16 This brings us down to Commonwealth v. Ireland, which, as noted above
reiterated what appears to be an inconsistent statement, that intent was essential
but would be inferred from certain unintentional touchings.
Conclsion
How has this study of the cases aided out purposes? It appears that the negligent criminal battery is in existence in Pennsylvania. Although the latest appellate
court cases say that intent is necessary but will be inferred from certain drcumstances, a comparison of the facts of these cases with those of other cases which
merely require grossly negligent conduct discloses that the conduct of the defendant
was the same in both. That is to say, that the grossly negligent conduct from which
the court infers intent is the same conduct from which they previously sustained
convictions of assault and battery without going into the element of intent. In view
of this it is difficult to find adequate reasons for upholding the language of inferring
intent. Could it not simply be said that gross negligence evidencing a wanton disregard for the safety of others will supply the mental element for a conviction of
assault and battery?
14 Corn. v. Donnelly, 113 Pa. Super. 173, 172 A 190 (1934).
15 Corn. v. Kalb, 129 Pa. Super. 241, 195 A 428 (1937).
16 Corn. v. Nottoge, 13 D & C 448 (1929); Corn. v. Bowsord. 23 Berks 239 (1930); Corn.
v. Bedard, 23 Berks 58 (1930); Corn. v. Moshinskie, 30 Sch. 393 (1931); Corn. v. Levan, 26
Berks 151 (1934); Corn. v. Hines, 44 Lanc. 690 (1935).
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The difficulty remains of precisely defining what degree of negligence is
necessary, but it is of questionable assistance to say that it must be such as will
allow a jury to infer intent and then sustain convictions where the defendant did
not act intentionally but merely negligently. It is interesting to note that it is well
settled in Pennsylvania that the degree of negligence required for a conviction of
involuntary manslaughter is less than that required for assault and battery. 17 It appears that if the negligence is of the degree required for assault and battery and the
victim dies the defendant would be guilty of murder. 18
Our research has also disclosed that the negligent criminal battery existed long
before the advent of the automobile. Our Superior Court recognized this when, in
referring to decisions holding that one could be guilty of assault and battery by
driving at a speed which menaced the safety of others it said:
"These decisions involve no new departure in the criminal law, they
merely apply well recognized and established principles to the conditions
arising out of the introduction of high powered vehicles capable of high
speed".' 9
However, since the coming of the automobile the number of situations calling
for the application of these rules has greatly increased; thus emphasizing the necessity for a clear definition of that crime.
As to the propriety of holding one criminally responsible for his unintentional
batteries, it is submitted that one of the principal objects of criminal law being
deterrence, the high degree of danger involved in operating such potentially dangerous instruments as automobiles requires that society take such drastic measures
to promote the safety of its members.
John C. Dowling
17 Corn. v. Gill, 120 Pa. Super. 22, 182 A 103 (1935); Com. v. Ireland, 149 Pa. Super. 298,
27 A 2d 746 (1942).
18 Com. v. Ochs, 91 Pa. Super. 528 (1927); Com. v. Beattie, 93 Pa. Super. 404 (1928); Corn.
v. Gill, 120 Pa. Super. 22, 182 A 103 (1935).
19 Corn. v. Coccodrelli, 74 Pa. Super. 324 (1920).

